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Active CDS Trading and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We investigate how the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market affects firms’ 
voluntary disclosure choices. The CDS market has been criticized, inter alia, for (i) its 
vulnerability to insider trading by informed lenders who trade on borrowers’ private information, 
and (ii) the reduction in lenders’ monitoring efficiency due to their ability to shed credit risk 
exposure via CDSs. Consistent with voluntary disclosure theory, we predict that informed 
trading by lenders and the consequent threat of private information revelation in the spreads of 
actively traded CDSs will pressure managers to enhance their voluntary disclosures to mitigate 
the risks associated with non-disclosure. Further, the reduction in lender monitoring will lead 
shareholders to intensify their own monitoring efforts and demand increased voluntary 
disclosures from managers. Consistent with these predictions, we find that managers are more 
likely to issue earnings forecasts and to forecast more frequently when their firms have actively 
traded CDSs. Our results also suggest that liquid CDSs discipline managers to disclose bad news 
earnings forecasts, despite their career- and wealth-related incentives to withhold adverse 
information. In addition to disclosure via management forecasts, we document that liquid CDSs 
also enhance disclosure via firm-initiated press releases. Our findings suggest that the allegedly 
negative attributes of the CDS market could result in a positive externality for capital markets by 
eliciting enhanced voluntary disclosures and thus contribute to a richer information environment. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the effect of a significant institutional environment change of the 
last two decades – the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market – on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure choices.1 The CDS market has enabled financial institutions to distribute 
credit risk to parties who are more willing and able to bear it, thereby enhancing liquidity and 
flexibility in the financial system (Greenspan, 2004). However, many have criticized CDSs for 
significantly exacerbating the recent financial crisis (e.g., Bank of England, 2008, and Stanton 
and Wallace, 2011) and decreasing lender monitoring efficiency (e.g., Hu and Black, 2008, 
Ashcraft and Santos, 2009, and Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014). Another major criticism of 
the CDS market is that it is vulnerable to insider trading, as large financial institutions, the 
common counterparties in CDS contracts, often trade on inside information about CDS reference 
entities obtained in their capacity as private lenders (e.g., The Financial Times, 2005, Acharya 
and Johnson, 2007, Qiu and Yu, 2013, and Standard and Poor’s, 2007). We propose that the 
allegedly negative attributes of the CDS market result in a positive externality for capital markets 
by eliciting enhanced voluntary disclosure from CDS reference entities. 
An active CDS market can positively impact firms’ voluntary disclosure practices primarily 
through two channels: (i) by lowering managers’ threshold for voluntary disclosure due to the 
threat of private information revelation in CDS spreads via informed trading by lenders, and (ii) 
by reducing the intensity of lenders’ monitoring due to their ability to shed credit risk via CDSs, 
prompting a compensatory demand from shareholders for increased voluntary disclosure.  
The first channel builds directly on the insights from Dye’s (1985) model of partial 
voluntary disclosure when investors are unsure whether managers have private information. If 
                                                
1 A CDS protects the buyer of the contract against default risk in return for a periodic payment (the CDS spread) 
over the term of the contract. The buyer is compensated if the reference entity and/or its credit instruments 
experience a “credit event” specified in the contract, such as default, certain types of restructuring, and bankruptcy.  
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managers do not disclose information, investors cannot distinguish whether their silence 
indicates negative information or managers’ unawareness of the information. Dye (1985) shows 
that firm value will decrease if managers disclose no information when investors have come to 
believe that they have private information. Therefore, as the probability that investors know that 
managers have private information increases, more information will be disclosed. In our setting, 
large financial institutions trade in the CDS market to satisfy their hedging and speculative 
needs. They also serve as dealers in this market, often supplying CDS spread quotes for firms to 
which they have loan exposure. Because these institutions typically do not have perfect Chinese 
walls between their lending and trading activities, material non-public information obtained 
through their lending activities is frequently traded on in the CDS market. Trading by informed 
lenders thus often results in the revelation of a substantial amount of private information through 
CDS pricing (Glantz, 2003, Acharya and Johnson, 2007, Qiu and Yu, 2012, and Whitehead, 
2012). In the Dye (1985) framework, lenders’ informed trading in the CDS market will reduce 
investors’ uncertainty about managers’ possession of private information, resulting in more 
voluntary disclosures by managers, particularly bad news disclosures.2  
In addition to the valuation implications of non-disclosure, because CDS trading can 
inform investors that managers have private information that is not disclosed to the public, 
managers are also likely to face increased exposure to the litigation risk associated with non-
disclosure. While SEC’s Rule 10b-5 does not impose a general duty on managers to disclose 
their private information, legal scholars assert that the SEC guidance and case law impose an 
                                                
2 Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that CEOs and CFOs regularly monitor movements in their firms’ CDS 
spreads and are concerned about the revelation of private information through trading in the CDS market. For 
example, in a 2006 survey of CFOs conducted by CFO.com, more than 40 percent of the respondents expressed 
concern about potential conflicts of interest, such as banks using credit derivatives (http://ww2.cfo.com/banking-
capital-markets/2006/10/are-your-secrets-safe/). Consistent with CDS trading imposing pressure on firms to 
disclose, managers are frequently asked by market participants to comment on sizable changes in their firm’s CDS 
spreads when they are unaccompanied by public disclosure (Bloomberg, 2006, and The Wall Street Journal, 2006).  
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affirmative disclosure obligation when a previous disclosure becomes inaccurate, incomplete, or 
misleading (Skinner 1997). To the extent that CDS spreads convey new information that may 
call for an updating of previous disclosures, we expect the heightened litigation risk exposure to 
further motivate managers to enhance their voluntary disclosures.  
While there is evidence that lenders trade on their borrowers’ private information in the 
equity market, we expect lenders’ insider trading in the CDS market to be of significant 
importance in shaping voluntary disclosure practices. First, unlike informed trading in the CDS 
market, only non-bank institutional lenders, such as mutual and hedge funds, tend to trade on a 
borrower’s private information in the equity market, with no evidence of banks engaging in such 
behavior (e.g., Bushman et al., 2010, Ivashina and Sun, 2011, and Massoud et al., 2011). Second, 
the CDS market is considerably less regulated and, until recently, was subject to less stringent 
SEC scrutiny relative to the bond and stock markets (e.g., ISDA, 2003, Bloomberg, 2006, The 
Wall Street Journal, 2006, 2007, and Yadav, 2013).3 Third, CDS spreads often reflect private 
information ahead of public disclosures and price discovery in other markets, including equity, 
bond and  equity option markets (e.g., Glantz, 2003, Berndt and Ostrovnaya, 2007, Blanco et al., 
2005, Standard and Poor’s, 2007, and Whitehead, 2012). Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Qiu 
and Yu (2012) also show that the CDS market leads the equity market in price discovery, 
particularly when a CDS reference entity has a high number of ongoing banking relationships.  
With respect to the second channel through which the CDS market can lead to enhanced 
voluntary disclosure, we build on Vashishtha (2014), who links lenders’ monitoring intensity and 
voluntary disclosure. He shows that increased lender monitoring intensity following debt 
                                                
3 In particular, over our sample period, CDSs were largely exempted from the restrictions of SEC’s Rule 10b-5 
because swaps are excluded from the definition of “securities” by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000. In fact, until recently, there was ambiguity as to whether the SEC, the CFTC, or both had regulatory authority 
over the CDS market (e.g., Bloomberg, 2006). 
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covenant violations leads to greater demand from lenders for firm-specific information. 
Consequently, because equity holders to some extent delegate firm monitoring to private lenders, 
they will reduce their demand for firm-specific information, leading to decreased voluntary 
disclosure. Reversing the direction of this prediction, we propose that a reduction in lender 
monitoring due to their ability to reduce credit risk exposure via CDS contracts (e.g., Ashcraft 
and Santos, 2009, and Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014) leads shareholders to intensify their 
own monitoring efforts and demand enhanced public disclosure.4  
  We expect the CDS market to have a pronounced effect on managers’ disclosure choices 
mainly when CDS contracts are actively traded. Prior literature shows that liquidity enhances 
price discovery in the stock market due to the timely incorporation of information into prices 
(e.g., Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001, Khanna and Sonti, 2004, and Chordia et al., 2006). 
Supporting the importance of liquidity in enhancing the information content of CDS spreads, Qiu 
and Yu (2012) find that the most liquid firms in the CDS market are associated with the highest 
level of informed trading. Similarly, because liquid CDS contracts are easier and less costly to 
trade (Saretto, and Tookes, 2013), the reduction in lender monitoring and its effect on disclosure 
are likely to be more pronounced for actively traded CDSs. We follow Qiu and Yu (2012) and 
measure CDS liquidity by the annual CDS market depth, proxied by the average number of 
distinct dealers providing a firm’s daily CDS spread quotes over a given year.5  
To examine the effect of liquid CDSs on voluntary disclosure, we focus on the 
management decision to issue earnings forecasts, which represents one of the most important 
voluntary disclosure choices (Beyer et al., 2010). Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
                                                
4 Our prediction relies on the plausible assumption that stockholders, unlike private lenders, cannot request firms to 
provide them with private information for monitoring purposes and accordingly have to rely on public disclosures. 
5 Because CDSs trade over the counter, liquidity measures based on trading activity and bid-ask spreads are   
unavailable for a comprehensive sample of CDS contracts. We find robust results when we employ an alternative 
liquidity measure based on the number of distinct maturities of traded CDS contracts for a firm.  
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firms with actively traded CDS contracts are more likely to issue a management forecast relative 
to non-CDS firms or firms with less liquid CDS contacts. Economically, having liquid CDS 
contracts increases the likelihood of a management forecast by 14.0%. We reaffirm this finding 
and show that active CDS trading is strongly associated with the number of management 
forecasts issued; the management forecasts of firms with liquid CDSs are 1.49 times more 
frequent relative to those issued by other sample firms. While these findings are consistent with 
our predictions, it is possible that firms with liquid CDS contracts are different from other 
sample firms in ways that are systematically related to their voluntary disclosure choices. We 
conduct several tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns.   
First, we compare the sample of liquid CDS firms with a matched-firm control sample 
constructed using the propensity score matching methodology and continue to find that liquid 
CDSs have a significant effect on voluntary disclosures. Second, to further address endogeneity 
concerns in general and reverse causality in particular, we perform a number of tests that 
examine how an increase in CDS liquidity affects disclosure. We find that voluntary disclosure 
is significantly enhanced when a firm’s CDS liquidity switches from low to high. Third, we 
employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach, where our instruments capture bond investors’ 
hedging and speculative demand in the CDS market (e.g., Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2013, and 
Boehmer et al., 2014), which is not expected to be directly related to voluntary disclosure. 
Although we cannot be certain that our instruments are truly exogenous, the results of IV tests 
also suggest that firms with liquid CDSs are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings news.  
We next examine the effect of liquid CDSs on the voluntary disclosure of negative earnings 
news. The theoretical findings of Dye (1985), coupled with the fact that the information 
revelation of bad news is especially timely in the CDS market (Acharya and Johnson, 2007, and 
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Qiu and Yu, 2012), suggest that active CDS trading should motivate managers to disclose 
adverse information. Litigation threat is also more pertinent when managers delay the disclosure 
of negative news (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and Baginski et al., 2002). Additionally, 
shareholders’ concerns with respect to the reduction in lender monitoring are likely to be greater 
if the firm experiences an inferior performance. We focus on the sample of forecasting firms 
(i.e., firm-year observations with at least one management forecast) and find that liquid CDSs are 
associated with a significantly higher frequency of bad news forecasts, both in absolute terms 
and relative to the total number of management forecasts in a given year. We also find that the 
effect of liquid CDSs on bad news disclosures strengthens with negative credit news, as 
measured by an increase in abnormal CDS spreads, further suggesting that unobservable firm 
characteristics correlated with CDS liquidity are unlikely to drive forecasting behavior.  
Next, we validate that the enhanced bad news forecast disclosure is indeed driven by liquid 
CDSs and not by firm characteristics that are potentially associated with negative news. We 
repeat the analyses for the sample of liquid CDS firms with negative news in the forecast year 
and control firms without liquid CDSs matched on the magnitude of negative news, when 
negative news is measured by a negative earnings surprise or an increase in abnormal CDS 
spreads. We find that, conditional on negative news, firms with liquid CDSs have a significantly 
higher frequency of bad news earnings forecasts relative to their matched firms. Thus, liquid 
CDSs pressure managers to disclose bad news, despite their career- and wealth-related incentives 
for delaying the revelation of adverse information (Graham et al., 2005, and Kothari et al., 2009). 
To provide further support for the disciplining effect of liquid CDSs on bad news forecast 
disclosure, we also examine how CDSs affect the frequency of unbundled bad news forecasts 
(forecasts that are not bundled with earnings announcements). While most earnings forecasts are 
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issued in conjunction with earnings announcements in recent years (Anilowski et al., 2007, and 
Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009), unbundled forecasts are more salient and provide more timely 
information to investors (e.g., Atiase et al., 2005, and Baginski et al., 2012). We find that liquid 
CDSs induce the timely updating of earnings expectations via unbundled bad news forecasts, 
consistent with liquid CDSs pressuring managers to promptly disclose adverse information.  
In our final set of analyses, we explore the association between liquid CDSs and voluntary 
disclosure via press releases. Because identifying voluntary disclosure through press releases and 
determining the tone of press release news is challenging (see the discussion in Section 4.6), we 
view the press release tests as supplemental to our earnings forecast analyses. We find that firms 
with liquid CDSs issue a higher number of press releases and exhibit a higher frequency of 
negative press releases. Our findings suggest that, in response to actively traded CDSs, managers 
enhance disclosures not only through earnings forecasts but also via other disclosure channels.  
Our study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, we contribute to 
prior research on the impact of new securities markets on firms’ information environment (e.g., 
Skinner 1989, 1990) by examining a recent financial innovation – credit default derivatives. 
While some studies show the role of CDSs in improving financial flexibility (e.g., Saretto and 
Tookes, 2013), others indicate substantial negative consequences of CDS trading on firms’ credit 
risk, lender monitoring and insider trading (Subrahmanyam et al., 2012, Bolton and Oehmke, 
2011, and Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014). We extend this literature by highlighting a positive 
externality of CDS trading. Our results suggest that, by eliciting enhanced voluntary disclosures, 
active CDS trading contributes to a richer information environment in capital markets.  
Second, we contribute to the extensive research on voluntary disclosure. Prior studies have 
identified securities litigation, information uncertainty, institutional ownership, proprietary costs, 
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and investor sentiment as important drivers of disclosure choices (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983, 
Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008, Kwak et al., 2012, and Bozanic et al., 2013). However, with 
the exception of Lo (2014), who examines disclosure changes following the emerging market 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, little is known about how changes in the institutional 
environment affect managers’ incentives to disclose voluntarily (Beyer et al., 2010). Our paper 
addresses this void by shedding light on how the development of the CDS market induces 
managers to enhance their disclosure practices. In particular, our evidence suggests that active 
CDS trading plays a disciplining role by eliciting the voluntary disclosure of bad news.  
Finally, we extend the growing research on the consequences of lenders’ exploitation of 
their access to private information through lending relationships (Ivashina and Sun, 2011, and 
Massoud et al., 2011). Bushman et al. (2010) find that non-bank institutional lenders trade on 
private information in the secondary loan and equity markets, but that this informed trading has a 
positive effect on price discovery in both markets. Our contribution is to further highlight a 
potential positive externality of lenders’ access to a borrower’s private information. We suggest 
that the revelation of private information in CDS spreads, induced by informed lenders’ trading, 
can lead to positive capital market effects by enhancing firms’ voluntary disclosures.  
The next section presents our hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data. Section 4 reports our main results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Motivation, Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Information flows in the CDS market 
The CDS market has grown from an exotic niche market in the 1990s to become the 
largest credit risk trading venue, with a total notional CDS amount outstanding of $27 trillion in 
June 2012, following a peak of $62.2 trillion outstanding in the second half of 2007, prior to the 
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financial crisis.6 The dominant players in the CDS market are major banks and financial 
institutions that have access to material non-public information about CDS reference entities 
through their lending activities. This confidential information usually includes timely financial 
disclosures, covenant compliance information, amendment and waiver requests, financial 
projections, and plans for acquisitions or dispositions and is typically provided to lenders well in 
advance of its public release (Standard and Poor’s, 2007).7 In addition to trading in the CDS 
market to satisfy their hedging and speculative needs, informed lenders often serve as dealers in 
this market. While guidance from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association suggests 
that “…banks must not use private knowledge about corporate clients to trade instruments such 
as credit default swaps,” absent effective Chinese walls between loan officers and bank trading 
desks, material non-public information frequently gets traded on in the lightly regulated CDS 
market (e.g., The Economist, 2003, Financial Times, 2005, and Standard and Poor’s, 2007).  
In addition, hedge funds have lately intensified their CDS trading, further fuelling insider 
trading concerns. Hedge funds often gain access to private information through participation in 
syndicated loans (e.g., Bushman et al., 2010, Ivashina and Sun, 2011, and Massoud et al., 2011) 
and tight connections with large financial institutions (e.g., The Wall Street Journal, 2006, The 
New York Times, 2007, and Financial Times, 2009). In its first CDS “insider” trading case, the 
SEC recently charged a hedge fund with insider trading in CDSs on the basis of private 
information learned from a major investment bank (Financial Times, 2009, and Yadav, 2013).8  
                                                
6 CDS contracts are mostly standardized according to the guidance of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA). The contracts have a variety of standard terms, ranging from six months to thirty years, 
although CDS contracts with a five year maturity are the most actively traded.  
7 Reg FD exempts the private communication of information to lenders conditional on lenders adhering to the 
confidentiality provisions in loan agreements (LSTA, 2007a, 2007b, and Li et al., 2013). According to the Loan 
Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA), if lenders breach these provisions, as in the case of trading on private 
information, the selective disclosure to lenders may no longer qualify as Reg FD compliant.   
8 The SEC alleged that Jon-Paul Rorech from Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. tipped off Renato Negrin, a portfolio 
manager at Millennium Partners L.P., about a contemplated change to the bond structure of VNU N.V., and that 
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Because CDS spreads often reflect a substantial amount of private information transmitted 
via informed lender trading, changes in CDS pricing typically provide more timely feedback on a 
firm’s performance than the pricing of its public debt or equity securities (Glantz, 2003, and 
Whitehead, 2012). 9 Significant movement in credit derivatives prices without any corresponding 
news usually serves as an indication to investors that private lenders have received information 
that is not yet public (Standard and Poor’s, 2007). Prior empirical research also demonstrates that 
the CDS market often leads other securities markets in price discovery, including equity, equity 
options and bond markets (Blanco et al., 2005, Acharya and Johnson, 2007, Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya, 2007, and Qiu and Yu, 2012).10 Blanco et al. (2005) highlight that price discovery is 
more likely to occur in the market in which informed traders transact the most. The micro-
structure of the CDS market, its synthetic nature, and liquidity provision from different credit 
holders seeking to hedge their exposure make it the primary forum for trading credit risk, thus 
leading to faster price discovery. Lenders trading on a borrowers’ private information and the 
consequent prompt reflection of such information in CDS spreads should make the firms’ 
withholding of information evident to investors. 
We predict that the frequent revelation of private information in the CDS market, which 
often leads public information disclosures and price discovery in other markets, affects 
managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose information to investors. Information disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                          
Negrin purchased a CDS contract on VNU N.V for the Millennium hedge fund. The District Judge in the Southern 
District of New York, in a judgment of the case, extended the reach of Rule 10b-5 insider trading provisions to the 
CDS markets. However, legal scholars continue to argue that traditional insider trading laws applied to the CDS 
market pose serious challenges as the law must accommodate the distinctive features of trading in credit derivatives 
(e.g., Levene, 2012, and Yadav, 2013).    
9 For example, in a number of acquisition transactions (e.g., First Data, HCA Inc., Harrah’s Entertainment Inc., and 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp), CDS spreads reflected information about upcoming deals weeks ahead of the deals’ 
public announcements and price movements in the equity and bond markets (The Wall Street Journal, 2006, 2007, 
Bloomberg, 2006, and The New York Times, 2007). 
10 Longstaff et al. (2005) and Norden and Weber (2007) also suggest that the CDS market plays an important role in 
equity and bond price discovery.  
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theory sheds light on why voluntary disclosures will increase when an alternate information 
source, such as the CDS market, reveals managers’ private information. Theoretical research on 
disclosure supports the full voluntary disclosure of managers’ private information using adverse-
selection-based arguments; non-disclosure will increase investor skepticism and decrease firm 
value, which in turn encourages managers to disclose (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980, and 
Grossman, 1981). Dye (1985) (and subsequently Jung and Kwon, 1988) show the possibility of 
partial disclosure when investors are unsure whether managers have private information. In the 
Dye (1985) model, if managers do not disclose, investors cannot distinguish whether the non-
disclosure is due to the adverse content of the information or because managers are unaware of 
the information. Consequently, if managers do not disclose when investors have come to believe 
that they are informed, firm value will be adversely affected. As a result, when the probability of 
investors knowing that managers have received private information increases, more information 
will be disclosed, particularly adverse information.11 In our setting, if private information is 
revealed through CDS prices, the probability that investors know that managers have private 
information increases, resulting in more voluntary disclosure.  
In addition to the valuation implications of non-disclosure, managers may be concerned 
about an increased litigation threat if an alternate information source, such as the CDS market, 
reveals that managers have private information that is not disclosed to the public. Skinner (1997) 
discusses the legal ramifications of the non-disclosure of private information, in particular the 
non-disclosure of bad news. Clause (2) of SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for managers “to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
circumstances in which they were made, not misleading”. While legal scholars concur that this 
rule does not impose a general duty to disclose, most agree that managers have an affirmative 
                                                
11 See Sletten (2012) for the empirical implications of Dye (1985) in an equity market setting.  
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disclosure obligation when a previous disclosure becomes inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading. 
Many earnings-related lawsuits allege that managers had an obligation to disclose private 
information in a timely manner if subsequent events rendered the company's statements in its 
previous public filings or press releases misleading. Further, in Sec. Act Rel. 6084, 17 SEC 
Dock. 1048, 1054 (1979), the SEC has stated that “there is a duty to correct statements made in 
any filing... if the statements have become inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events. ...” Thus, 
because CDS spreads often convey new information that may indicate that previous disclosures 
need to be updated, it is likely that the threat of litigation associated with non-disclosure will also 
induce managers to enhance their voluntary disclosure practices. 
The theoretical implications of Dye (1985) and the litigation threat argument lead us to 
predict that the threat of CDS spreads revealing private information will have a significant effect 
on the voluntary disclosure of bad news. While a number of studies show that firms tend to 
preempt large negative earnings surprises (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and Kasznik and Lev, 
1995), Kothari et al. (2009) argue that career concerns and managers’ wealth tied to firm 
performance can induce managers to withhold the disclosure of bad news in the hope that 
subsequent favorable outcomes will obviate the need to disclose it. Survey evidence in Graham 
et al. (2005) also suggests that managers have strong incentives to withhold bad news. Because 
the information revelation of bad news is especially timely in the CDS market (Acharya and 
Johnson, 2007, and Qiu and Yu, 2012), managers’ withholding of bad news should become 
evident to investors. Accordingly, managers will inform investors via public disclosures to 
mitigate adverse effects on firm value. Also, litigation concerns are greater when managers delay 
the disclosure of negative news (e.g., Skinner, 1994, 1997, and Baginski et al., 2002). Plaintiffs 
in class-action lawsuits typically claim large losses due to significant security price declines 
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caused by managers not disclosing adverse information promptly. Therefore, we expect the 
threat of lenders engaging in informed trading on negative private information in the CDS 
market to overshadow managers’ career- and wealth-related incentives for delaying bad news 
and lead to its prompt disclosure.  
Due to the threat that lenders may engage in informed trading in the CDS market, managers 
may be compelled to inform investors at the same time that they convey information to lenders, 
thus providing public disclosures prior to or simultaneous with information revelation through 
CDS spreads. However, managers may also choose to respond to informed trading by lenders, 
thus providing public disclosures subsequent to informing lenders and the consequent private 
information revelation through CDS spreads. Because our main focus is to examine whether 
CDS trading elicits enhanced voluntary disclosures and because the exact timing of the 
information provision from managers to lenders is unobservable, our predictions relate to overall 
disclosure intensity, without differentiating between these two potential disclosure strategies. 
2.2 Change in lender monitoring intensity  
 An extensive literature in financial economics has studied the relationship between 
lender monitoring and credit-risk transfer mechanisms. Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1995) examine credit risk transfer in the context of loan sales and demonstrate the 
significant dilution of the loan originator’s monitoring incentives after a loan or a portion of the 
loan is sold on the secondary market. This moral hazard issue is more pronounced when credit 
risk is transferred via CDSs, because, unlike loan sales, where the control (or monitoring) rights 
are transferred to a buyer who has an incentive to continue monitoring (albeit with an inferior 
information set relative to the original lender’s), a CDS contract does not transfer control or 
monitoring rights to the CDS counterparty (Marsh, 2009, Stulz, 2010, and Parlour and Winton 
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2013). Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Roychowdhury and Martin (2014) provide consistent 
evidence, suggesting lower monitoring intensity when borrowers have traded CDS contracts.    
We expect that the stockholders of the borrowing firm will step in to fill the monitoring 
vacuum caused by the lenders’ weakened monitoring incentives. This prediction is motivated by 
Vashishtha (2014), who shows that there is a trade-off between monitoring by private lenders 
and shareholders. More specifically, he finds that, following debt covenant violations, an 
increase in monitoring intensity by lenders leads to an increase in lenders’ demand for borrower-
specific information. As a result, stockholders, who typically delegate some of the firm’s 
monitoring to lenders, decrease their demand for information, leading to a reduction in the 
borrower’s voluntary disclosures. Consistent with these arguments, we expect that a firm’s 
stockholders will be cognizant of the lower intensity of lenders’ monitoring in the presence of 
traded CDS contracts. Because, unlike lenders, stockholders cannot increase their monitoring by 
accessing borrowers’ private information, we expect them to demand more public disclosures.  
The reduction in lender monitoring also supports our prediction that CDS trading will 
discipline managers to disclose adverse information. Lenders tightly monitor underperforming 
borrowers via private communication, such as covenant compliance reports and frequent 
performance updates and projections. We therefore expect that the reduction in lender 
monitoring in the presence of CDS trading will be of particular concern to shareholders in these 
circumstances, leading them to pressure managers to publicly disclose bad news.  
2.3 The importance of CDS liquidity and empirical predictions 
We expect that via both channels – CDS spreads revealing private information and lenders 
reducing their monitoring intensity – CDSs affect managers’ voluntary disclosure practices 
primarily when CDS contracts are actively traded, i.e., when CDS contracts are highly liquid. 
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With respect to the first channel, while there is little evidence on the role of liquidity in price 
discovery in the CDS market, prior research shows that liquidity enhances price discovery in the 
stock market. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Khanna and Sonti (2004) show that 
liquidity stimulates trading by informed investors, thus making stock prices more informative. 
Liquid prices reflect information on a more timely basis, increase the incorporation of private 
information, enhance the convergence of stock prices to fundamentals, and are more informative 
about a firm’s future performance (e.g., Chordia et al., 2006, Sadka and Scherbina, 2006, Fang et 
al., 2009, and Kerr et al., 2013). The high involvement of informed financial institutions in 
liquidity provision in the CDS market further supports the importance of liquidity in enhancing 
the information content of CDS spreads. Qiu and Yu (2012) show that the number of dealers 
providing CDS spread quotes is determined to a large extent by the number of banking 
relationships of the CDS reference entity and that the reference entities that are traded most 
actively in the CDS market are associated with the highest level of informed trading. The authors 
infer that liquidity in the CDS market is provided by informed financial institutions.  
The importance of CDS liquidity in our empirical predictions also extends to the second 
channel – enhanced disclosures as a result of reduced lender monitoring. Lenders are more likely 
to hedge their credit exposure using CDSs when they are able to enter CDS positions more 
easily, i.e., in the presence of actively traded CDS contracts (Saretto, and Tookes, 2013). 
Therefore, the reduction in a lender’s monitoring efficiency will be most acute when CDSs are 
highly liquid. This, in turn, will lead to increased shareholder monitoring and the consequent 
increase in shareholder demand for enhanced voluntary disclosures. 
To examine our hypotheses, we focus on one of the most important voluntary disclosure 
choices – management’s decision to issue earnings forecasts. Beyer et al. (2010) show that, for 
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the average firm, earnings forecasts account for 15.67% of the quarterly return variance and 
represent the main accounting-based information disclosure. Particular to our setting, earnings 
information has a significant importance to CDS market participants as well as to lenders. 
Shivakumar et al. (2011) find that earnings forecasts represent an important information event in 
the CDS market. In addition, private lenders frequently get management updates about expected 
earnings via private financial disclosures, covenant compliance reports, and amendment and 
waiver requests, mainly because of the widespread use of earnings-based covenants in loan 
contracts. We thus expect managers to increase disclosure in the form of earnings forecasts in 
response to the threat that upcoming earnings news will be revealed in CDS spreads and/or in 
response to the increased shareholder demand for information following reduced lender 
monitoring. Specifically, we predict that firms with liquid CDSs are more likely to inform 
investors via earnings forecasts relative to non-CDS firms or firms with low liquidity CDSs.  
Given that managers may inform investors through additional disclosures, we supplement 
our analyses by examining another voluntary disclosure channel – firm-initiated press releases. 
We predict that firms with liquid CDS contracts have higher press release intensity relative to 
other sample firms. Across earnings forecasts and press release disclosures, we expect liquid 
CDS trading to have a pronounced effect on the voluntary disclosure of bad news. 
 
3. Sample, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Data sources and sample selection 
We employ the First Call database to obtain management forecast characteristics.12 The 
data on traded CDS contracts, including contract existence, the number of dealers and CDS 
                                                
12 Chuck et al. (2013) demonstrate that the First Call database does not incorporate all management forecasts 
(relative to a sample of forecasts hand-collected through a search of firm press releases). Because our sample period 
starts in 2002, this issue is mitigated for our study, as Chuck et al. (2013) show that First Call’s coverage is more 
comprehensive after 1997.   
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spreads are from the Markit database, which covers the traded CDS contracts of U.S. firms 
starting in 2002. Data on firms’ lending relationships is retrieved from the DealScan database 
provided by the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation. Bond trading data is obtained from 
the TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) database and data on outstanding 
principal amounts and bond ratings are obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities 
database. Data on firm-initiated press releases is from RavenPack News Analytics, which covers 
all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires. Data on firm characteristics is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. We obtain data on analyst coverage, equity issuances and institutional 
ownership from the I/B/E/S, Security Data Corporation’s Global News Issues and Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) databases, respectively.   
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. To align the availability of data from our 
two primary data sources, the First Call and Markit databases, we focus on the 2002-2010 period.  
For this period, First Call covers 8,702 firms, representing 57,396 firm-year observations. 
Requiring COMPUSTAT data on firm characteristics restricts our sample to 5,034 firms, 
representing 25,130 firm-year observations. After matching this final sample used in our tests 
with Markit, we obtain 775 firms with traded CDS contracts over the sample period, representing 
4,517 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our primary variables of interest. Our main 
CDS liquidity measure is estimated based on the number of distinct dealers providing CDS 
spread quotes for the firm on a given day and serves as a proxy for market depth (following Qiu 
and Yu, 2012). We focus our analyses on CDS contracts with a five-year maturity, which 
represents the most commonly traded CDS contract maturity and the only one for which Markit 
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reports the number of distinct dealers providing CDS spread quotes.13 We estimate the annual 
average of the number of distinct dealers providing daily quotes for each firm in our sample 
(Depth). CDS quotes are provided, on average, by six dealers, with a standard deviation of 4.4 
and an interquartile range of 5.9, suggesting substantial variation in market depth across firms. 
To account for the inter-temporal evolution in the number of dealers providing spread quotes in 
the CDS market over our sample period, we define the Liquid CDS variable as equal to one if the 
firm’s annual Depth measure in a given year is above the sample median depth in that year, zero 
otherwise (all variables are described in detail in the Appendix). The mean value of Liquid CDS 
indicates that 9% of firm-year observations in our sample have liquid CDS contracts (note that 
18% of our firm-year observations have traded CDS contracts).  
We define the variable, Forecast, to be equal to one if the firm issues at least one annual or 
quarterly forecast in a given year, zero otherwise. The mean value of Forecast is 0.43, which 
indicates that a considerable number of firm-year observations in our sample have management 
forecast activity.14 Number of Forecasts is estimated as the number of annual and quarterly 
forecasts in a given year and has a sample mean of 2.05.15 Sample firms are relatively large, as 
reflected by the mean and median values of total assets (Firm Size). The mean market-to-book 
ratio (Market to Book) is 3.063. The mean ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to total 
assets (ROA) is -0.003. As reflected by the standard deviation of Return Volatility, there is 
considerable variation in riskiness across sample firms. Sample firms have substantial 
institutional ownership and analyst following. A relatively small proportion (9.2%) of firm-year 
                                                
13 We focus on MR (Modified Restructuring) clause, which represents one of the most common contract types in 
North America (Levin, 2005, and Berndt, 2007).  
14 Kwak et al. (2012) report similar descriptive statistics for their 1997-2009 sample period. 
15 Following previous studies (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005, and Houston et al., 2010), we exclude earnings forecasts 
issued between the fiscal-period end and the earnings announcement date, i.e., pre-announcements, because these 
forecasts are considered a part of the management’s earnings announcement strategy rather than voluntary 
disclosure activity. Our inferences remain the same when we include these pre-announcements in the measurement 
of forecast issuance and frequency (untabulated). 
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observations has equity issuances (Equity Issuance) and 32.7% of firm-year observations belong 
to high litigation industries (High Litigation Industry).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The impact of liquid CDS trading on management forecasts 
We begin our analyses by testing the relation between earnings forecast activity and the 
existence of liquid CDS contracts for the firm, controlling for other firm characteristics that are 
likely to be associated with forecasting activity. We estimate the following model: 
Forecast Activity  = β0 + β1Liquid CDS + ∑ βiFirm Controli + ε (1)
where Forecast Activity is one of the following two earnings forecast characteristics. Forecast is 
an indicator variable reflecting whether a firm has issued at least one earnings forecast in a given 
year. Number of Forecasts is the number of management forecasts issued within the year. Our 
main variable of interest, Liquid CDS, captures the existence of liquid CDS contracts for a firm, 
as measured in the year preceding the forecast year. We control for firm size, the market-to-book 
ratio, profitability, return volatility, institutional ownership, analyst following, equity issuance 
and membership in a high litigation industry (e.g., Baginski et al., 2002, Ajinkya, 2005, Bergman 
and Roychowdhury, 2008, Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009, and Kwak et al., 2012).16 Following 
prior research, except for profitability, return volatility and equity issuance, all of which relate to 
the forecast year, other determinants of Forecast are measured in the year preceding the forecast 
year. In all analyses, standard errors are clustered at the firm level. We estimate model 1 as a 
Probit (Poisson) regression when the dependent variable is Forecast (Number of Forecasts). 
                                                
16 In light of Greene’s (2004) criticism relating to the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear models, we do not 
incorporate year and industry fixed effects into the model. However, in untabulated robustness tests, when we add 
these fixed effects to the estimation, our findings and inferences are unchanged.  
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We present our findings in  Table 3, Panel A. Consistent with our predictions, a significant 
and positive coefficient on Liquid CDS in column 1 indicates that the likelihood of an earnings 
forecast is positively associated with the existence of a firm’s liquid CDS contracts. This result is 
also economically significant – the existence of liquid CDS contracts increases the likelihood of 
a forecast by 14.0%. For comparison, a one standard deviation change in institutional ownership 
and analyst following increases this likelihood by 8.6% and 12.7%, respectively. We also find 
that Liquid CDS is significantly associated with the number of management forecasts (column 2). 
The economic magnitude of this effect is sizable – the coefficient estimate of 0.395 on Liquid 
CDS corresponds to an incidence rate ratio of 1.49, suggesting that forecasts of firms with liquid 
CDSs are 1.49 times more frequent relative to forecasts issued by other sample firms.17   
The coefficient estimates on control variables are generally consistent with prior studies.18 
Firms with higher profitability are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts and 
issue a higher number of forecasts, while firms with a higher market-to-book ratio and higher 
stock return volatility are less likely to issue forecasts and forecast less frequently. Forecast 
activity is also increasing in institutional ownership and analyst following and is higher for firms 
belonging to high litigation industries, but is negatively associated with equity issuances.19  
In Panel B of Table 3, we replicate our tests with an alternative liquidity measure based on 
the number of distinct maturities (terms) of a firm’s CDS contracts traded on a given day. We 
                                                
17 In untabulated robustness tests, we exclude the crisis years of 2008 and 2009 due to low CDS market liquidity in 
these years. Our findings with respect to both forecast likelihood and frequency remain unchanged.  
18 While earnings forecast activity is expected to increase with firm size, we obtain a negative coefficient on the 
Log(Total Assets) variable. We find that this result is potentially due to the non-linearity in the relation between 
voluntary disclosure and firm size. In untabulated analyses, we include a squared term of the firm size measure and 
find a positive coefficient on firm size and a negative coefficient on the squared term. It is also possible that a 
negative coefficient on the Log(Total Assets) is driven by the high correlation between the Log(Total Assets) and 
Analyst Following. When the latter is excluded from the model, we observe a positive coefficient on Log(Total 
Assets). Note that the relation between disclosure measures and our main variable of interest, Liquid CDS, is 
unaffected by these changes to the model specification.   
19 Our results are unchanged if the firms are assigned to a high litigation industry based on the measure developed 
by Kim and Skinner (2012) instead of the SIC-code-based measure used in our primary analyses. The results are 
also robust when we control for analyst forecast dispersion and firm leverage.  
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acknowledge that this measure is a noisy proxy for market depth, as it is likely to be affected by 
a firm’s debt maturity structure and by differences in investors’ hedging demand for different 
debt terms. Hence, we view this analysis as a robustness check with respect to the tests presented 
in Panel A.20 We measure the annual average of the number of distinct terms for each firm in our 
sample. Sample firms have, on average, 7.6 distinct CDS contract terms. We set the term-count-
based Liquid CDS variable to be equal to one if the firm’s annual average term count measure in 
a given year is above the sample median term count in that year, zero otherwise. We continue to 
find that liquid CDSs are strongly positively associated with earnings forecast disclosures. The 
economic significance of the term-count-based liquid CDS measure is similar to that observed in 
our primary tests. The existence of liquid CDS contracts increases the likelihood of a 
management forecast by 13.7% and the incidence rate ratio for the management forecasts of 
firms with liquid CDS contracts relative to that of other sample firms is 1.47.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with our hypothesis that actively 
traded CDSs enhance managers’ voluntary disclosure activity. However, an important potential 
concern is the possibility that firms with liquid CDS contracts are different from non-CDS firms 
or from firms with low liquidity CDS contracts in ways that are systematically related to 
voluntary disclosure choices. To examine whether endogeneity is likely to affect our findings, 
we employ three additional sets of tests, discussed in the next section: 1) propensity score 
matching, 2) liquidity change analyses, and 3) an instrumental variables approach.  
4.2 Propensity score matching (PSM)  
4.2.1 Determinants of liquid CDS trading 
To conduct PSM, we compare the disclosure choices of liquid CDS firms with a matched 
                                                
20 Saretto and Tookes (2013) use the daily number of CDS quotes as their primary liquidity measure, which 
represents a combination of distinct term counts provided by different dealers. While this measure is not provided by 
the Markit database, it is similar in spirit to our term-count-based measure.  
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sample of non-CDS or non-liquid CDS firms. We construct a matched sample using PSM, as in 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). PSM allows us to efficiently address the possibility that 
forecasting behavior is correlated with observable firm characteristics that are substantially 
different for high CDS liquidity firms relative to other sample firms (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002, and Li and Prabhala, 2007). We estimate the following liquid CDS Probit model: 
Liquid CDS = β0 + β1Asset Maturity + β2Leverage + β3Market-to-Book  + β4ROA + 
β5Tangibility + β6Firm Size + β7Earnings Volatility + β8Number of 
Lenders + β9Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume + ε (2)
 
Prior literature suggests that asset maturity, leverage, the market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, tangibility, asset size and earnings volatility are associated with the existence of 
CDS trading in general and CDS liquidity in particular (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009, Saretto 
and Tookes, 2013, Boehmer et al., 2014, and Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014). Following Qiu 
and Yu (2012), who find a strong positive relation between the number of distinct dealers 
providing CDS quotes and the number of firm lenders, we also control for the number of distinct 
lenders involved in a firm’s outstanding syndicated loan contracts (Number of Lenders).  
In addition, consistent with Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) and Boehmer et al. (2014), 
we include a proxy for bond investors’ hedging and speculative demand in the CDS market. We 
focus on the ease with which investors can accomplish their hedging and speculative objectives 
in the bond market without the need to trade in the CDS market. Oehmke and Zawadowski 
(2013) show that CDS markets are larger when it is more difficult to trade in the underlying bond 
securities. In other words, investors prefer the CDS market as the trading venue for their credit 
hedging and speculative needs when the bond market is characterized by trading frictions and 
low liquidity. Following Boehmer et al. (2014), we use the average bond trading volume of a 
firm’s two-digit SIC industry peers to proxy for CDS trading demand. If investors need to trade 
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the credit risk of firms with a particular type of underlying asset (i.e., firms in a particular 
industry), the industry bond tradability is expected to impact the firm’s CDS liquidity. Therefore, 
we expect a negative relation between the firm’s CDS liquidity and its industry peers’ bond 
trading volume (Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume), as higher bond market liquidity should 
be associated with lower CDS trading needs.  
We find that CDS liquidity is positively related to asset maturity, market-to-book ratio and 
asset size (Table 4, Panel A). The coefficient on Number of Lenders is positive and significant, 
consistent with the positive relation between CDS liquidity and the extent of lenders’ informed 
trading (Qiu and Yu, 2012). As predicted, the coefficient on Industry Peers’ Bond Trading 
Volume is negative and significant, in line with lower demand for a liquid CDS market when the 
bond market is more liquid (Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2013, and Boehmer et al., 2014).      
4.2.2 Propensity score matching test  
We present the PSM estimation in Table 4, Panels B and C. We match treatment 
observations (i.e., firm-year observations with liquid CDSs) with control observations (firm-year 
observations without CDSs or with non-liquid CDSs) based on the probability (i.e., the 
“propensity score”) of Liquid CDS, as estimated in Panel A. We employ the commonly used 
“nearest neighbor matching” approach, with the further restriction that the absolute difference in 
the propensity scores of matched observations be below a pre-specified threshold (i.e., “caliper 
distance”). More specifically, we match without replacement and, to ensure appropriately 
matched samples, if no untreated observations have propensity scores within the specified caliper 
distance, the treated observation is left unmatched and is excluded from the matched sample. We 
successfully match 1,005 liquid CDS observations with the control group, yielding 2,010 firm-
year observations for our analyses. We also test the matched samples for covariate balancing. 
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The differences in variable means between the high CDS liquidity sample and the control sample 
are insignificant for all firm characteristics employed in the liquid CDS Probit model (Panel B).  
We present the regression analysis for the matched samples in Panel C of Table 4. Despite 
a substantially smaller sample size relative to the one employed in our primary tests, we find a 
statistically significant effect of Liquid CDS on earnings forecasts disclosure. This result holds 
for both the likelihood of issuing a management forecast and the number of management 
forecasts issued. In untabulated robustness analyses, we employ coarser caliper distances that 
yield slightly unbalanced but larger samples and find that our inferences are unchanged.  
4.3 A change in CDS liquidity and voluntary disclosure  
While the PSM analyses suggest that systematic differences between firms with liquid 
CDSs and other sample firms are unlikely to explain our main findings, we realize that it is 
always challenging to rule out endogeneity concerns. In particular, because prior literature shows 
that higher disclosure quality leads to more liquid equity trading due to reduced information 
asymmetry (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991, and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), there is a 
concern of reverse causality, i.e., that voluntary disclosure could also affect liquidity in the CDS 
market. We would like to emphasize that in the CDS market, liquidity is provided primarily by 
informed financial institutions with access to a firm’s private information (Qiu and Yu, 2012). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a firm’s public disclosures would affect the liquidity provision by 
these institutions. However, to rigorously address the potential reverse causality issues and 
further mitigate the endogeneity concerns associated with the characteristics of liquid CDS firms, 
we perform a number of tests to examine how an increase in CDS liquidity affects disclosure.21 
                                                
21 In untabulated analyses, we also examine the impact of CDS initiation on the propensity and frequency of 
management forecasts and find consistent results (i.e., CDS initiations increase voluntary disclosure). However, we 
do not pursue this line of inquiry because the main focus of our study is on liquid CDSs, and therefore a change 
from low to high CDS liquidity is the most relevant shock for our setting. 
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4.3.1 Management forecast activity following a switch to high CDS liquidity 
In the first set of our analyses, we examine whether a firm’s voluntary disclosure is more 
extensive following a switch from low to high CDS liquidity. We begin by identifying a sub-
sample of firms that experienced an increase in CDS liquidity. For each firm, we isolate the year 
in which CDS liquidity changed from low to high for the first time during the sample period 
(year t) and then compare managers’ voluntary disclosure in the pre- and post-change periods. 
We focus on the three-year period starting with the year of the CDS liquidity change (years t to 
t+2) versus the three-year period prior to the change (years t-3 to t-1). Note that CDS liquidity 
remains stable after the switch to high liquidity, i.e., the vast majority of firms do not revert back 
to low liquidity in subsequent years. We estimate the following model: 
Forecast Activity  = β0 + β1CDS Liquidity Switch + ∑ βiFirm Controli + ε (3)
where Forecast Activity is one of the two earning forecast variables, Forecast and Number of 
Forecasts, as defined in previous analyses. Our main variable of interest, CDS Liquidity Switch, 
captures the switch from low to high CDS liquidity. This indicator variable takes the value of 
one in the post-change period (years t to t+2) and zero in the pre-change period (years t-3 to t-1). 
We include the same controls as in our primary tests.  
We present the results of estimating model 3 in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, Panel A. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that the management forecast activity is significantly 
more intensive following a switch to high CDS liquidity (Table 5, Panel A). Economically, the 
likelihood of a management forecast is higher by 5.3%. The incidence rate ratio for management 
forecasts following a switch to high liquidity, relative to that of the previous period, is 1.54.  
We acknowledge that the increase in CDS liquidity from the low to high category may be 
driven by changes in firm fundamentals and that the increase in voluntary disclosure could be 
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caused by these changes in fundamentals as well. If an increase in CDS liquidity is driven 
primarily by changes in firm fundamentals, we expect that these changes would also significantly 
increase liquidity in the equity market. Accordingly, we exclude firms that, in addition to an 
increase in CDS liquidity, also experience an increase in stock market liquidity in the same year 
(year t) and re-run our tests. An additional benefit of these analyses is that they further help to 
address the reverse causality concern. If an increase in management forecast activity is the 
primary driver of an increase in CDS liquidity, it will also likely increase the liquidity of a firm’s 
equity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991, and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Therefore, by 
focusing on firms that do not experience an increase in stock market liquidity simultaneously 
with an increase in CDS liquidity, it is more likely that our results are capturing the effect of an 
increase in CDS liquidity on voluntary disclosure activity, rather than the other way around.  
We measure stock market liquidity by equity trading volume. We classify firms as having 
an increase in stock market liquidity if their annual average stock trading volume in year t is 
above the sample median in that year, while it was below the sample median in the previous year 
(consistent with our median-based cut off for measuring the change from low to high CDS 
liquidity). We present the results of this estimation in columns 3 and 4 of Panel A. We find that 
restricting our sample to firms that experience an increase in CDS liquidity but no simultaneous 
increase in equity market liquidity does not affect our findings. The coefficient estimates on 
Liquid CDS Switch are similar in both statistical and economic significance to those presented in 
columns 1 and 2. In unreported robustness tests, we measure equity market liquidity based on the 
firms’ equity bid-ask spreads and find very similar results.  
4.3.2 Changes analyses  
To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we estimate a changes specification, where we 
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relate changes in forecast activity to the change in CDS liquidity. Because it is challenging to 
define the change in forecast activity based on Forecast, which is an indicator variable, we focus 
on the change in the number of management forecasts in these analyses. We examine the same 
sample of firms that experience an increase in CDS liquidity that we employ in Panel A and 
estimate the following model: 
 
Δ Number of Forecasts = β0 + β1 Δ Liquid CDS +∑  βi Δ Firm Controli  +  ε                          (4)                     
 
where Δ Number of Forecasts is the change in the number of forecasts relative to the previous 
year. Our main variable of interest, Δ Liquid CDS, takes a value of 1 in the year of CDS liquidity 
increase (year t), zero otherwise. We include changes in all the control variables used in the 
previous tests. For each control variable, the change is measured relative to the previous year.  
We present the results in column 1 of Table 5, Panel B. We find that the coefficient on        
Δ Liquid CDS is positive and highly significant. Economically, an increase in CDS liquidity from 
low to high increases the number of earnings forecasts by 0.47, which represents 22.8% of the 
sample mean. Although our changes specification controls for changes in firm characteristics, in 
column 2, we repeat the estimation after excluding firms that experience a simultaneous increase 
in stock market liquidity. The coefficient estimate on Δ Liquid CDS remains significant.  
4.4 Instrumental variables approach 
Our instrumental variables approach is based on the simultaneous estimation of the 
management forecast activity model (equation 1) and the CDS liquidity model (equation 2). To 
instrument CDS liquidity, we rely on the Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume variable, which 
captures bond investors’ hedging and speculative demand in the CDS market. The bond trading 
volume of industry peers should not directly affect a firm’s voluntary disclosure choices. While 
it is possible that some disclosure patterns may be similar for firms in the same industry (e.g., 
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Rogers et al., 2014), there is no obvious reason to expect a strong association between a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure and its industry peers’ bond trading volume. To further alleviate a concern 
that our instrument proxies for industry-specific disclosure trends, in untabulated robustness 
tests, we control for Industry×Year fixed effects and find similar results. Also note that even if 
some omitted correlated factors can contribute to both a firm’s enhanced disclosure and higher 
industry peers’ bond market liquidity, a negative relation between the liquidity in the bond and 
CDS markets indicates that these factors cannot simultaneously explain the positive effect of 
CDS liquidity on voluntary disclosure.  
For firms with credit rating data on bonds outstanding, we also utilize a bond-rating-based 
measure as an alternative instrument that reflects bond investors’ trading demand in the CDS 
market.22 Qiu and Yu (2012) show an inverse U-shaped relation between CDS liquidity and 
credit rating, with bond investors’ hedging demand in the CDS market being the strongest for 
bonds on the investment grade/speculative grade frontier. While bonds with very high credit 
quality have little hedging demand because bond investors are not interested in insuring them, as 
credit quality declines, bond investors become more interested in purchasing credit protection. 
However, when the credit rating falls below investment grade, credit protection becomes too 
expensive and bond investors may prefer to bear the risk instead of buying CDS contracts. In 
addition, many portfolio managers are forced to sell bonds when they reach speculative grade 
due to rating-based investment restrictions, further diminishing CDS hedging demand for 
speculative grade bonds.23 We create an indicator variable, Investment/Speculative Grade 
                                                
22 We do not conduct the PSM analysis where the CDS liquidity model includes the Investment/Speculative Grade 
Frontier variable because the substantially smaller number of firms with available credit ratings results in very small 
matched samples.  
23 Qiu and Yu (2012) suggest that the lower CDS liquidity of risky firms may also be driven by the supply side. 
Dealers should be less willing to provide quotes for risky CDS reference entities, as these quotes are essentially open 
limit orders. 
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Frontier, which is equal to 1 if a firm’s bonds outstanding in a given year have an average credit 
rating of BBB+, BBB, or BBB-, and zero otherwise. In untabulated analyses, we re-run the CDS 
liquidity Probit model with Investment/Speculative Grade Frontier to proxy for bond investors’ 
trading demand and, as expected, find a positive and significant coefficient on this variable.  
We do not expect this measure to be directly related to a firm’s voluntary disclosure 
choices. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence in the extensive disclosure literature 
that voluntary disclosure varies with credit rating in general, or that it peaks at the investment 
grade/speculative grade boundary in particular. Although some may argue that firms with credit 
ratings at the investment/speculative grade boundary may have greater incentives to disclose, we 
do not observe this relation empirically. For the general COMPUSTAT population, we find that 
the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts are indeed insignificantly impacted by 
whether a firm’s rating is at the investment/speculative grade frontier (untabulated).  
We evaluate the incremental explanatory power of the instruments with a Wald Chi2 test. 
The Chi2 test statistic is highly significant in both specifications: 12.05 with a p-value of <0.001 
when we use Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and 5.94 with a p-value of 0.015 when we 
use Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier. This evidence suggests strong instruments. 
Although the Stock and Yogo (2005) thresholds for F-statistics are typically used to evaluate the 
strength of the instruments, these thresholds are relevant only for the standard two-stage least 
squares estimation with a linear first-stage model. To the best of our knowledge, similar 
benchmarks are not available for estimations with the first-stage Probit model, as in our case.  
We present our findings in Table 6. The first two columns report the results of the 
estimation where the CDS liquidity model is based on Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume, 
while the third and fourth columns report results based on Investment/Speculative Grade 
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Frontier.  In all four specifications, we continue to find a significant and positive coefficient on 
Liquid CDS. 24 Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients on Liquid CDS in the IV estimations 
are not comparable to those in our primary analyses (Table 3) due to the way STATA conducts 
the simultaneous estimation of the first and the second stages when the second stage is a non-
linear model.25 While the results of the instrumental variables approach further support our 
proposition that managers of firms with liquid CDSs are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
earnings news, we acknowledge that we cannot be certain that our instrumental variables are 
truly exogenous. 
4.5 Liquid CDSs and bad news management forecasts  
4.5.1. The disciplining effect of liquid CDSs on bad news disclosure 
Having reported results suggesting that liquid CDSs are associated with the manager’s 
decision to issue earnings forecasts, we next explore whether liquid CDSs affect the voluntary 
disclosure of bad news. We expect the disciplining effect of liquid CDS trading to pressure 
managers to enhance the voluntary disclosure of bad news, despite managers’ career- and 
wealth-related incentives for delaying the revelation of adverse information. To test our 
prediction, we limit our sample to forecasting firms (firm-year observations with at least one 
management forecast) and examine the frequency of bad news management forecasts. We 
estimate the following model:  
Bad News Forecast Frequency Measure = β0 + β1Liquid CDS + ∑ βiFirm Controli + ε (5)
                                                
24 The IV estimation is also not sensitive to using the quintile and quartile rank measures of Industry Peers’ Bond 
Trading Volume instead of the decile-based measures used in the tabulated tests (untabulated).  
25 To simultaneously estimate the first stage CDS liquidity model and the second-stage disclosure model, we use the 
“ivprobit” and “ivpoisson” functions in STATA. While this simultaneous approach yields correct standard errors 
that do not overestimate the statistical significance, the first stage is estimated as an OLS regression, yielding 
coefficients that are not comparable to our main estimation. To shed more light on the comparison of the 
coefficients, we estimate the IV model using a “manual” two-stage approach, in which the predicted value of the 
first-stage Probit model is used in the second stage. We obtain coefficient estimates that are similar in magnitude to 
those reported in Table 3. We do not tabulate this manual approach as it may overstate the statistical significance. 
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where Bad News Forecast Frequency Measure is one of the following two variables: Bad News 
Forecast Frequency and Relative Bad News Forecast Frequency, reflecting the number of bad 
news management forecasts within a given year and the proportion of bad news forecasts to the 
total number of forecasts within a given year, respectively. We identify bad news earnings 
forecasts by comparing the management forecast with the most recent consensus analyst forecast 
(e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007), after adjusting for bundled forecasts following the procedure in 
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013). On average, the forecasting firms in our sample issue 1.77 bad 
news forecasts per year; the relative frequency of bad news forecasts to total forecasts is 37.3%. 
As in previous analyses, Liquid CDS reflects whether a firm has liquid CDS trading. We include 
the same set of firm-level controls as in our other tests.  
We find strong support for our predictions:  the coefficient on Liquid CDS is positive and 
significant when estimating both the absolute and relative frequency of bad news forecasts 
(Table 7, Panel A, columns 1 and 2). Economically, the incidence rate ratio of bad news 
forecasts for firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of other sample firms is 1.19. The proportion 
of bad news forecasts is higher by 5.1% for high CDS liquidity firms, which represents 13.6% of 
the mean bad news relative frequency for the sample firms. These results are consistent with 
liquid CDSs disciplining managers to voluntarily disclose negative earnings news. 
In columns 3 and 4, we seek to provide further support for this inference by testing whether 
the effect of liquid CDSs on the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts is stronger when there 
is more negative credit news, i.e., when CDS spread changes are high. Because the revelation of 
private information through CDS spreads is especially timely when credit news is negative 
(Acharya and Johnson, 2007) and because shareholders are likely to impose significant pressure 
on managers to disclose when they observe meaningful increases in CDS spreads, we expect the 
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effect of liquid CDSs on bad news earnings forecasts to be stronger when CDS spread changes 
are high.26 To conduct these tests, we employ our bad news forecast frequency model (model 5) 
and substitute Liquid CDS with two variables: Liquid CDS High Spread Change and Liquid CDS 
Low Spread Change. Liquid CDS High Spread Change (Liquid CDS Low Spread Change) is an 
indicator variable taking the value of one if a firm with liquid CDSs experiences an annual CDS 
spread change that falls into the top tercile (bottom two terciles) of the CDS spread changes in a 
given forecast year, zero otherwise. To capture firm specific news, we base the CDS spread 
change measure on a firm’s abnormal CDS spread change relative to the average CDS spread 
change of all firms in the firm’s credit rating category (we use four common credit rating 
categories: AAA to AA-, A+ to BBB+, BBB to BB and BB- to D).27 
For both the absolute and relative frequency of bad news forecasts, we find that the effect 
of liquid CDSs on the frequency of bad news disclosure is substantially stronger when firms 
experience high CDS spread changes (an F-test indicates that the coefficients on Liquid CDS 
High Spread Change are significantly higher relative to those on Liquid CDS Low Spread 
Change). We view these CDS-spread-based results as further supporting the disciplining role of 
liquid CDS trading. The amplifying effect of high CDS spread changes on the impact of liquid 
CDSs on earnings forecasts also highlights that enhanced forecast disclosure is unlikely to be 
explained by the systematically different characteristics of firms with liquid CDSs.28 
                                                
26 Our tests presume that high CDS spread changes convey negative news to both debt and equity investors. While it 
is possible that what debt holders consider negative news, as estimated by CDS spreads, may represent positive 
news to equity holders, this possibility is most likely to occur around events associated with debt-equity conflicts of 
interest, such as mergers and acquisitions, debt issuances, share repurchases, or dividend payments (e.g., De Franco 
et al., 2013). It is less likely to occur with respect to earnings news.  
27 In untabulated robustness tests, we obtain similar results when we base Liquid CDS High Spread Change (Liquid 
CDS Low Spread Change) on the median value of abnormal CDS returns in a given year.  
28 In untabulated analysis, we substitute high CDS spread changes with an informed trading measure by adapting the 
approach in Acharya and Johnson (2007). Specifically, we regress the daily equity returns on five lags of the daily 
CDS spread changes and measure the degree of informed trading by the extent of the equity returns predicted by the 
lagged changes in CDS spreads, where negative predicted values indicate high informed trading in the CDS market. 
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4.5.2. The effect of CDS liquidity, conditional on the extent of negative news  
To further validate that enhanced bad news forecast disclosure is a result of liquid CDSs 
and is not merely affected by firm characteristics correlated with negative news, we conduct our 
analyses for the sub-samples of firms that experience negative news of similar magnitude. The 
ideal experiment would be to compare two firms with the same level of negative news that is 
known to insiders, such as managers and private lenders, but unobservable to outsiders, with 
only one of the firms having actively traded CDSs. Then, controlling for other determinants of 
forecast disclosure, if the firm with liquid CDSs is found to have stronger bad news forecast 
activity than the firm without liquid CDSs, we would infer that active CDS trading indeed 
encourages managers to disclose bad earnings news. Absent an opportunity to perform this ideal 
experiment, we focus on realized negative news, relying on the plausible presumption that this 
news is known to insiders before its release to outside investors.  
We employ a matching approach to identify a control firm for each sample firm with liquid 
CDSs that experiences negative news in the forecast year. We match each of these treatment 
firms with a firm without liquid CDSs based on the magnitude of negative news. We measure 
negative news by two proxies: a negative earnings surprise and an increase in abnormal CDS 
spreads in the year in which we measure management forecast activity. The advantage of the first 
measure is that it is strongly related to management forecast activity and is available for all firms 
in the sample. Our second proxy, the abnormal CDS spread change, precisely measures the 
extent of negative credit news, but is available only for firms with traded CDS contracts, which 
results in the control firms being sampled out from this population only.29 
                                                                                                                                                          
We find that the impact of liquid CDSs on voluntary disclosure is enhanced in the presence of high informed trading 
in the CDS market.  
29 We measure an earnings surprise as the difference between the actual EPS minus the mean analyst consensus 
forecast, deflated by the beginning stock price. The mean analyst consensus is based on the first summary forecast 
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We re-estimate model 5 for the matched samples and present the results of our analyses in 
Table 7, Panel B. In columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4), we use a negative earnings surprise (abnormal 
CDS spread change) to proxy for negative news. Supporting the disciplining role of liquid CDSs 
in the voluntary disclosure of bad earnings news, we find positive and significant coefficient 
estimates on Liquid CDS in all four specifications, suggesting that active CDS trading 
significantly increases both the absolute and relative frequency of bad news forecasts. For 
specifications based on a negative earnings surprise, we find that the incidence rate ratio of bad 
news forecasts for firms with liquid CDSs relative to that of the control sample firms is 1.50. The 
proportion of bad news forecasts is higher by 8.3% for firms with liquid CDSs, which represents 
20.6% of the mean relative frequency of bad news for the firms employed in this analysis. The 
economic significance is similar when we proxy for negative news by the abnormal CDS spread 
change in columns 3 and 4. The incidence rate ratio of bad news forecasts for firms with liquid 
CDSs relative to that of the control sample firms is 1.34, while the proportion of bad news 
forecasts for firms with liquid CDSs is higher by 7.1%.  
4.5.3. Liquid CDSs and the frequency of unbundled bad news management forecasts 
To provide further support for the disciplining effect of liquid CDSs on bad news forecast 
disclosure, in the next set of analyses, we focus on the frequency of unbundled bad news 
earnings forecasts (forecasts that are not bundled with earnings announcements). Although 
issuing earnings forecasts in conjunction with earnings announcements has become a common 
practice in recent years (Anilowski et al., 2007, and Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009), unbundled 
forecasts are typically more salient and likely to provide more timely earnings expectation 
updates to investors (e.g., Atiase et al., 2005, and Baginski et al., 2012). Consequently, if active 
                                                                                                                                                          
following the date of the previous year's earnings announcement. We measure the abnormal CDS spread change 
relative to the average CDS spread change of all firms in the firm’s credit rating category (we use four common 
credit rating categories: AAA to AA-, A+ to BBB+, BBB to BB and BB- to D).  
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CDS trading pressures managers to promptly disclose adverse information, we predict that firms 
with liquid CDSs have a higher frequency of unbundled bad news earnings forecasts.  
We estimate model 5 above by using the number of unbundled bad news management 
forecasts – Unbundled Bad News Forecast Frequency and Relative Unbundled Bad News 
Forecast Frequency – as the dependent variables. The results reported in Table 8 reveal a 
positive and significant relation between Liquid CDS and the frequency of unbundled bad news 
earnings forecasts. In terms of economic significance, the incidence rate ratio of unbundled bad 
news forecasts for firms with liquid CDSs, relative to that of other firms, is 1.19 and the 
proportion of unbundled bad news forecasts is higher by 5.5% for liquid CDS firms. This 
evidence that liquid CDSs induce the timely updating of earnings expectations via unbundled 
forecast disclosure further supports the disciplining role of active CDS trading. 30  
4.6 Liquid CDSs and firm-initiated press releases as an additional disclosure channel  
While earnings forecasts are a firm’s primary voluntary disclosure device (Beyer et al., 
2010), managers may also convey information to investors via other channels. To provide a more 
complete picture of the effect of active CDS trading on disclosure, we next examine the relation 
between a firm’s liquid CDSs and its disclosures via press releases. We acknowledge that 
quantifying voluntary disclosure via press release is challenging for two reasons. First, some 
press releases may accompany mandatory SEC filings, but, short of reading all the press releases 
issued by the sample firms, we cannot distinguish such releases from the voluntary ones. Second, 
the estimation of the tone of the press release news is mainly qualitative and relies on linguistic 
analyses, resulting in a less precise news measure than earnings forecast news. We therefore 
                                                
30 In untabulated tests, we examine two additional aspects of managers’ forecast choices, forecast precision and 
accuracy. We do not find a significant relation between these forecast characteristics and liquid CDSs. With respect 
to precision, 96.4% of our sample firms issue point or range forecasts (versus open-ended or qualitative forecasts), 
which can explain, at least partially, the lack of power in our precision tests.   
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view our press release tests as largely supplementary to our earnings forecast analyses.   
We obtain press release data from RavenPack, which reports press releases disseminated 
via Dow Jones Newswires and employs a variety of advanced textual analysis techniques to 
create a news sentiment score for each release. To ensure that we are capturing firm-initiated 
press releases, we only include those releases with a relevance score of 90 or greater. This score 
indicates how strongly the firm is related to the underlying news story; press releases with a 
relevance score below 90 often relate to cases where the firm is mentioned in press releases of 
other firms. To measure whether a press release conveys positive or negative news, we employ 
RavenPack’s Composite Sentiment Score (CSS), which reflects the strength of the news 
sentiment in a press release. CSS scores range from 0 to 100, with 50 indicating the cutoff 
between positive and negative news. To create a sharper differentiation between negative and 
positive press releases, we allow for a neutral news range. We define press releases with a score 
above 51 as indicating positive news, press releases with a score below 49 as indicating negative 
news and press releases with a score between 49 and 51 as indicating neutral news. Our findings 
and inferences are robust to alternative cutoffs for the neutral news range (untabulated).31  
After matching our sample to RavenPack, we identify press release data for the vast 
majority of the sample firms (23,555 firm-year observations). Untabulated descriptive statistics 
suggest that the mean (median) value of the number of press releases issued by the sample firms 
during a given year is 43.5 (34). We begin by investigating the effect of liquid CDSs on the 
                                                
31 CSS combines 5 sentiment scores, while ensuring that there is no sentiment disagreement amongst these scores. 
The PEQ score represents the news sentiment of a given news item according to the PEQ classifier, which identifies 
positive and negative words and phrases in articles about firms with publicly traded equity. The BEE score 
represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the BEE classifier, which identifies sentiment in news 
stories about earnings evaluations. The BMQ score represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the 
BMQ classifier, which specializes in short commentary and editorials on global equity markets. The BCA score 
represents the news sentiment of a given news story according to the BCA classifier, which specializes in reports on 
corporate action announcements. The BAM score represents the news sentiment of a given story according to the 
BAM classifier, which specializes in news stories about mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. The PEQ and BEE are 
dictionary-based measures, while the BMQ, BCA and BAM are based on the Bayesian learning approach.  
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number of press releases during a given year (because all the firms in our sample have at least 
one press release per year, we do not estimate the likelihood of a press release). We estimate 
model 1 with the Number of Press Releases as the dependent variable. We present the results of 
this estimation in column 1 of Table 9. We find a positive and significant coefficient estimate on 
Liquid CDS, suggesting that firms with actively traded CDS contracts issue a higher number of 
press releases. This effect is also economically significant – the incidence rate ratio for press 
releases issued by firms with liquid CDSs, relative to that of other sample firms, is 1.30.  
We next examine whether active CDS trading disciplines managers to voluntarily disclose 
negative press releases. Untabulated descriptive statistics reveal that managers tend to 
communicate primarily positive and neutral news via press releases. Sample firms issue, on 
average, 20.36 and 19.88 positive and neutral press releases per year, respectively, while issuing 
only 2.95 negative press releases per year. We employ model 5 above to estimate the frequency 
of negative press releases. We employ two frequency measures: Bad News Press Release 
Frequency and Relative Bad News Press Release Frequency, reflecting the number of bad news 
press releases within a given year and the proportion of bad news press releases to the total 
number of press releases within a given year, respectively. We present the results in columns 2 
and 3 of Table 9. The coefficient estimates on Liquid CDS are positive and significant in both 
columns. The incidence rate ratio of bad news press releases issued by firms with liquid CDSs 
relative to that of other sample firms is 1.36. In terms of relative frequency, the proportion of bad 
news press releases is higher by 1.0% for firms with high CDS liquidity. While this effect may 
seem to be modest, given the extremely low frequency of bad news press releases, it represents 
15.8% of the average annual bad news press release frequency for the sample firms.  
Overall, our tests of firm-initiated press releases supplement earnings forecast analyses and 
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provide further support for the role of liquid CDSs in determining voluntary disclosure. These 
tests also suggest that liquid CDSs induce voluntary disclosures through multiple channels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The development of the CDS market is perhaps one of the most significant innovations in 
the financial institutional environment. The CDS market has grown rapidly in the last two 
decades, transacting trillions of dollars in notional amounts. However, the CDS market has its 
critics. A frequently expressed criticism is the market’s susceptibility to insider trading, given 
that large financial institutions, the biggest participant group in the market, often have access to 
privileged information about CDS reference entities through their lending relationships. CDS 
spreads reflect a substantial amount of private information transmitted via lenders’ informed 
trading, with changes in CDS pricing providing more timely feedback on a firm’s performance 
than its bond or equity pricing does (e.g., Acharya and Johnson, 2007, Qiu and Yu, 2012, and 
Whitehead, 2012). Another concern often raised is that CDS trading leads to a reduction in 
lender monitoring of CDS reference entities, since lenders can shed their credit risk via CDSs 
(e.g., Hu and Black, 2008, Ashcraft and Santos, 2009, and Martin and Roychowdhury, 2014).  
We propose that these aspects of the CDS market provide two channels through which 
CDSs enhance the voluntary disclosures of the reference entities. First, the threat of lenders 
trading on private information in the CDS market and the consequent prompt reflection of such 
information in CDS spreads will pressure managers to enhance their voluntary disclosures in 
order to mitigate the risks associated with non-disclosure. Second, managers will provide more 
voluntary disclosures to satisfy shareholders’ demand for more information to compensate for 
the reduction in lender monitoring that follows CDS trading. We expect these effects on 
managers’ voluntary disclosure to be evident mostly for firms with liquid CDSs because a liquid 
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market will lead to greater information revelation and also facilitate risk shedding by lenders. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that firms with actively traded CDS contracts are 
more likely to inform investors via earnings forecasts. We further find that these firms exhibit a 
higher frequency of bad news management forecasts and of unbundled bad news forecasts in 
particular. In addition to eliciting management forecasts, we also find that liquid CDSs prompt 
enhanced disclosures via firm-initiated press releases. Overall, our evidence suggests that active 
CDS trading plays a disciplining role by pressuring managers into promptly revealing their 
private information, thus enriching the information environment in capital markets. 
Our paper sheds light on how changes in the institutional environment affect changes in 
managerial disclosure behavior. The advent of CDSs on the financial landscape has introduced 
an alternate information source that reveals private information before it is impounded in equity 
and bond prices. CDSs have also substantially altered lenders’ monitoring dynamics by 
providing them with an opportunity to decrease credit risk exposure. Our findings suggest that 
informed trading by lenders in the CDS market and the reduction in lender monitoring intensity, 
although a cause for concern, result in a positive externality for capital markets. They help to 
alleviate managers’ reluctance to issue management forecasts, particularly bad news forecasts, 
and encourage prompt disclosure of material price-sensitive information to market participants.  
Specifically in relation to informed trading in the CDS market, prior research questions 
whether there is a case for the current regulatory response to curb insider trading in the CDS 
market (Acharya and Johnson, 2007). Our evidence suggests one potential unintended 
consequence of such regulatory action. Restricting informed trading in the CDS market may 
adversely impact the information environment in capital markets by displacing an effective 
incentive for managers’ voluntary disclosure. 
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APPENDIX  
Variable Definitions  
Variable   Definition 
Analyst Following = Analyst coverage at the end of the fiscal year, calculated as log 
(1 + the number of I/B/E/S analysts who issue annual earnings 
forecasts for the firm).  
Asset Maturity = Weighted maturity of the firm’s assets, defined as (gross PPE 
divided by depreciation expense × gross PPE divided by total 
assets) + (current assets divided by cost of goods sold × current 
assets divided by total assets). 
Bad News Forecast Frequency = The number of bad news management forecasts issued during 
the year.  
Bad News Press Release Frequency = The number of bad news press releases issued during the year, 
estimated by the press releases covered by the RavenPack 
database, with a relevance score of 90 or greater. Bad news 
press releases are defined as those with RavenPack’s 
Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) below 49. 
Equity Issuance  = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues equity 
during the forecast year, zero otherwise.  
Forecast = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm issues at least one 
earnings forecast during the year, zero otherwise.   
High Litigation Industry = An indicator variable that equals one for high litigation 
industries (SIC codes: 2844-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 8731-8734), zero otherwise.  
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume  
 
= This measure is based on the decile rank measure of the 
average annual bond trading volume for a firm’s two-digit SIC 
industry peers. This measure is constructed as follow. For each 
firm in our sample, we use TRACE to retrieve the bond trading 
volume for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry. We 
also obtain the face value of each bond on the issue date from 
the Mergent database. To account for size differences, we 
deflate the dollar volume of principal traded on a given day by 
the face value of the bond on the issue date. We then estimate 
the annual average bond trading volume of a firm’s industry 
peers. We convert this measure into a decile rank bond trading 
volume measure to better reflect variation in bond market 
liquidity.  
Institutional Ownership 
 
= Institutional ownership (%) at the end of a given fiscal year, 
measured as the fraction of total shares outstanding held by 
institutional investors.  
Investment /Speculative Grade Frontier  = This measure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s 
bonds outstanding in a given year have an average credit rating 
of BBB-, BBB, or BBB+, zero otherwise. We use the Mergent 
database to retrieve the credit ratings of a firm’s bonds 
outstanding in a given year. If a firm has more than one bond 
outstanding, we average the credit ratings across all bonds.  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Variable   Definition 
Leverage = Total debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Liquid CDS = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s annual Depth 
measure in a given year is above the sample median depth in that 
year, zero otherwise. Depth is the number of distinct dealers 
providing CDS spread quotes for the firm on a given day, averaged 
over the year. For the analyses in Table 3, Panel B, this indicator 
variable is equal to one if the firm’s annual Term Count measure in a 
given year is above the sample median term count in that year, zero 
otherwise. Term Count is the count of distinct maturities (terms) of a 
firm’s CDS contracts traded on a given day, averaged over the year. 
 Δ Liquid CDS = An indicator variable that takes the value of one in a year when CDS 
liquidity increases from low to high, zero otherwise. 
Liquid CDS Switch = An indicator variable that takes the value of one in the post-CDS 
liquidity switch period (i.e., the year in which a firm’s CDS liquidity 
switches from low to high and the following two years) and zero in 
the pre-switch period (i.e., three years prior to the year in which a 
firm’s CDS liquidity switches from low to high).  
Liquid CDS High Spread Change 
(Liquid CDS Low Spread Change) 
= An indicator variable equal to one if a firm with liquid CDSs 
experiences an annual CDS spread change that falls in the top tercile 
(bottom two terciles) of the CDS spread changes in a given forecast 
year, zero otherwise. To capture firm specific news, the CDS spread 
change measure is based on a firm’s abnormal CDS spread change 
relative to the average CDS spread change of all firms in the firm’s 
credit rating category (we use four common credit rating categories: 
AAA to AA-, A+ to BBB+, BBB to BB, and BB- to D). 
Log (Total Assets) = The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of a fiscal year. 
Market to Book = The ratio of the market value to the book value of equity at the fiscal 
year end. 
Number of Forecasts = Number of management earnings forecasts issued during the year.  
Δ Number of Forecasts = The annual change in the number of earnings forecasts issued. 
Number of Lenders = The decile rank measure of the number of unique lenders involved in 
a firm’s outstanding syndicated loans in a given year, identified 
using the DealScan database. 
Number of Press Releases = The number of press releases issued by a firm during a given year, 
estimated by the press releases covered by the RavenPack database, 
with a relevance score of 90 or greater. 
Relative Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
= The relative frequency of bad news management earnings forecasts 
issued during the year, defined as the number of bad news forecasts 
divided by the total number of forecasts. 
Relative Bad News Press Release 
Frequency 
 
Relative Unbundled Bad News 
Forecast Frequency 
= 
 
 
= 
The relative frequency of bad news press releases issued during the 
year, defined as the number of bad news press releases divided by 
the total number of press releases.  
The relative frequency of unbundled bad news management earnings 
forecasts issued during the year, defined as the number of unbundled 
bad news forecasts divided by the total number of forecasts. 
Return Volatility = The standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns measured 
over the forecast year (multiplied by 100 for scaling purposes). 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Variable   Definition 
ROA = The return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. 
Tangibility  = Net PPE divided by total assets.  
Unbundled Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
= The number of unbundled bad news management forecasts issued 
during the year. Unbundled forecasts are defined as management 
forecasts that are not bundled with earnings announcements (i.e., 
forecasts issued outside of the two day window around an earnings 
announcement). 
Volatility of Earnings = The standard deviation of annual changes in earnings divided by total 
assets calculated over five years prior to the forecast measurement.  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
TABLE 1  
Sample Selection and Composition 
This table presents the sample selection process.  
# of firms  # of firm-years 
(1)     Observations with First Call coverage from 2002 to 2010 8,702 57,396 
(2)     Sample after eliminating observations with missing data 5,034 25,130 
         Of these, observations with traded CDS contracts 775 4,517 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics (see Table 1 for the sample selection procedure). Variables are defined in 
the Appendix.  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Depth 4,517 6.045 4.405 2.644 4.568 8.596 
Liquid CDS 25,130 0.090 0.286 0 0 0 
Forecast 25,130 0.425 0.494 0 0 1 
Number of Forecasts 25,130 2.050 3.009 0 0 4 
Log (Total Assets) 25,130 7.091 1.888 5.703 6.957 8.275 
Market to Book 25,130 3.063 3.092 1.411 2.135 3.470 
ROA 25,130 -0.003 0.172 0.000 0.031 0.073 
Return Volatility 25,130 3.039 1.651 1.865 2.605 3.754 
Institutional Ownership (%) 25,130 51.313 34.246 19.934 56.679 81.016 
Analyst Following 25,130 1.956 0.621 1.386 1.946 2.398 
Equity Issuance  25,130 0.092 0.288 0 0 0 
High Litigation Industry 25,130 0.327 0.469 0 0 1 
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TABLE 3 
 The Relation between Active CDS Trading and Management Forecasts 
 
This table presents the analyses of the association between liquid CDS trading and management forecasting 
behavior. The analyses in Panel A utilize our primary CDS liquidity measure based on the Depth of a firm’s traded 
CDS contracts. The analyses in Panel B utilize an alternative CDS liquidity measure based on the Term Count of a 
firm’s traded CDS contracts. In both panels, specification 1 presents a Probit regression of the likelihood of a firm 
issuing at least one earnings forecast during the year, while specification 2 presents a Poisson regression of the count 
of the number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: Liquid CDSs and the Likelihood and Number of Management Forecasts 
Forecast Number of Forecasts 
   (1) (2) 
Liquid CDS 0.359*** 0.395*** 
[5.39] [6.80] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.132*** -0.092*** 
[-11.71] [-7.14] 
Market to Book -0.018*** -0.009* 
[-3.77] [-1.73] 
ROA 1.093*** 1.771*** 
[12.11] [13.94] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.008*** 
[13.33] [13.11] 
Analyst Following 0.524*** 0.506*** 
[16.79] [15.65] 
Return Volatility -0.090*** -0.113*** 
[-11.87] [-12.28] 
Equity Issuance  -0.204*** -0.191*** 
[-5.61] [-4.23] 
High Litigation Industry 0.201*** 0.219*** 
[5.09] [5.48] 
Number of obs. 25,130 25,130 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.138 
 (continued) 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
The Relation between Active CDS Trading and Management Forecasts 
 
Panel B: Alternative Measure of CDS Liquidity 
 Forecast Number of Forecasts 
   (1) (2) 
Liquid CDS 0.353*** 0.387*** 
[5.48] [6.90] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.132*** -0.090*** 
[-11.76] [-7.01] 
Market to Book -0.018*** -0.008 
[-3.72] [-1.62] 
ROA 1.097*** 1.783*** 
[12.13] [13.99] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.008*** 
[13.31] [13.13] 
Analyst Following 0.527*** 0.510*** 
[16.90] [15.81] 
Return Volatility -0.091*** -0.114*** 
[-11.97] [-12.37] 
Equity Issuance  -0.206*** -0.195*** 
[-5.68] [-4.31] 
High Litigation Industry 0.201*** 0.220*** 
[5.10] [5.50] 
Number of obs. 25,130 25,130 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.138 
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TABLE 4 
Propensity Score Matching  
This table presents the propensity score matching (PSM) analyses. Panel A presents the first stage Probit model of 
liquid CDS trading, with Liquid CDS as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the differences in means for 
explanatory variables between the liquid CDS sample and the matched-firm sample to provide evidence of covariate 
balancing in the PSM estimation. Panel C presents the PSM model estimation.  Specification (1) presents a Probit 
regression of the likelihood of a firm issuing at least one earnings forecast during the year, while specification (2) 
presents a Poisson regression of the count of the number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-
statistics are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: CDS Liquidity Probit Model   
 
Liquid CDS 
(1) 
Asset Maturity 0.010* 
[1.74] 
Leverage 0.329 
[1.44] 
MTB 0.026*** 
[2.81] 
ROA 0.033 
[0.09] 
Tangibility -0.409 
[-1.55] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.643*** 
[21.14] 
Volatility of Earnings -0.74 
[-1.54] 
Number of Lenders 0.180*** 
[9.67] 
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume -0.042*** 
[-3.47] 
Number of obs. 19,340 
Pseudo R2 0.467 
(continued) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching  
Panel B: Covariate Balancing       
  Means Difference in  means 
Liquid CDS =1 Liquid CDS =0 [t-stats] 
        
Asset Maturity 11.58 12.19 -0.61 
[1.32] 
Leverage 0.28 0.28 -0.01 
[0.98] 
MTB 3.17 3.18 -0.01 
[0.05] 
ROA 0.05 0.05 0.00 
[0.11] 
Tangibility 0.35 0.36 -0.02 
[1.57] 
Log (Total Assets) 9.06 9.10 -0.04 
[0.79] 
Volatility of Earnings 0.04 0.04 0.00 
[0.72] 
Number of Lenders 8.36 8.23 0.14 
      [-1.42] 
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume 6.19 6.20 0.00 
[0.01] 
Number of obs. 1,005 1,005 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching  
 
Panel C: Propensity Score Matching  
Forecast Number of Forecasts 
    (1) (2) 
Liquid CDS 0.326*** 0.304*** 
[3.28] [3.77] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.199*** -0.110*** 
[-4.24] [-2.84] 
Market to Book -0.010 0.008 
[-0.67] [0.67] 
ROA -0.731 0.048 
[-1.40] [0.12] 
Institutional Ownership 0.008*** 0.007*** 
[5.11] [4.41] 
Analyst Following 0.410*** 0.390*** 
[4.86] [5.59] 
Return Volatility -0.190*** -0.183*** 
[-6.73] [-7.18] 
Equity Issuance  -0.148 -0.197 
[-1.03] [-1.47] 
High Litigation Industry 0.105 0.066 
[0.96] [0.78] 
Number of obs. 2,010 2,010 
Pseudo R2 0.150 0.122 
 (continued) 
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TABLE 5 
Change in CDS Liquidity 
 
This table presents analyses of CDS liquidity changes. The sample period is restricted to the three-year period prior 
to the year of the liquidity change and the three-year period starting with the year of the liquidity change. Panel A 
presents analyses of the switch in CDS liquidity from the low to high category. Columns (1) and (2) present the 
analyses for all firms that experience a switch in liquidity over our sample period. In Columns (3) and (4), the 
sample is restricted to those firms that do not experience an increase in stock market liquidity in a year when CDS 
liquidity increases. Specifications (1) and (3) present Probit regressions of the likelihood of a firm issuing at least 
one earnings forecast during the year, while specifications (2) and (4) present Poisson regressions of the number of 
management forecasts within the year. Panel B presents changes specification using OLS, where we relate changes 
in forecast activity to the change in CDS liquidity. Column (1) presents the analyses for all firms that experience an 
increase in liquidity over our sample period. In column (2), the sample is restricted to firms that do not experience 
an increase in stock market liquidity in a year when CDS liquidity increases. Robust z-statistics (t-statistics) are in 
brackets and are clustered by firm. 
Panel A: Liquidity Switch Analyses     
  Increased liquidity sample 
Increased liquidity sample, 
excluding firms with a  concurrent 
increase in stock liquidity 
  Forecast 
Number of  
Forecast 
Number of  
Forecasts Forecasts 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Liquid CDS Switch 0.140** 0.433*** 0.140** 0.437*** 
[2.42] [8.15] [2.31] [7.97] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.077* -0.055 -0.062 -0.039 
[-1.69] [-1.39] [-1.30] [-0.94] 
Market to Book 0.046*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
[2.94] [4.23] [2.93] [4.36] 
ROA -0.523 0.522 -0.844 0.239 
[-0.87] [1.13] [-1.28] [0.50] 
Institutional Ownership 0.004** 0.002 0.004** 0.002 
[2.32] [1.50] [2.25] [1.53] 
Analyst Following 0.216** 0.105 0.163 0.083 
[1.97] [1.26] [1.43] [0.93] 
Return Volatility -0.022 -0.074** -0.022 -0.073** 
[-0.63] [-2.37] [-0.56] [-2.24] 
Equity Issuance  -0.292** -0.198* -0.293** -0.188 
[-2.52] [-1.68] [-2.41] [-1.50] 
High Litigation Industry 0.147 0.222** 0.108 0.191** 
[1.15] [2.43] [0.80] [1.98] 
Number of obs. 2,292 2,292 2,083 2,083 
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.054 0.0300 0.0509 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Change in CDS Liquidity 
Panel B: Changes Analyses   
  Increased liquidity sample 
Increased liquidity sample, 
excluding firms with a concurrent 
increase in stock liquidity 
    
Δ Number of Forecasts Δ Number of Forecasts 
  (1) (2) 
Δ Liquid CDS 0.467*** 0.447*** 
[2.97] [2.78] 
Δ Log (Total Assets) 0.929*** 0.865*** 
[3.50] [3.11] 
Δ Market to Book 0.095*** 0.093*** 
[3.18] [2.92] 
Δ ROA 1.068 0.689 
[1.33] [0.72] 
Δ Institutional Ownership 0.003 0.003 
[1.02] [1.02] 
Δ Analyst Following -0.153 -0.202 
[-0.72] [-0.88] 
Δ Return Volatility 0.05 0.023 
[0.83] [0.34] 
Δ Equity Issuance  0.053 0.028 
[0.33] [0.16] 
Number of obs. 2,073 1,885 
Adjusted R2 0.0154 0.0130 
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TABLE 6 
 Instrumental Variable Analyses 
 
This table presents the second-stage estimation of the instrumental variable (IV) analyses, estimated simultaneously 
with the first-stage CDS liquidity model. Specifications (1) and (2) are based on the Liquid CDS model with the 
Bond Investors’ Demand measure to proxy for bond investors hedging and speculative demand in the CDS market, 
while specifications (3) and (4) are based on the Liquid CDS model with the Investment/Speculative Grade Frontier 
measure. Specifications (1) and (3) present a Probit regression of the likelihood of a firm issuing at least one 
earnings forecast during the year and specifications (2) and (4) present a Poisson regression of the count of the 
number of management forecasts within the year. Robust z-statistics are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
 
  Instrument = Bond Investors’ Demand  
 
Instrument = Investment/Speculative 
Grade Frontier 
      
Forecast Number of Forecasts Forecast Number of Forecasts 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Liquid CDS 2.303*** 2.614*** 1.585*** 1.689*** 
[6.52] [5.12] [4.53] [4.06] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.227*** -0.239*** -0.290*** -0.325*** 
[-8.50] [-5.61] [-5.52] [-4.38] 
Market to Book -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.013** -0.006 
[-8.27] [-4.40] [-2.12] [-0.54] 
ROA 1.149*** 1.759*** -0.217 0.257 
[14.37] [11.48] [-0.95] [0.72] 
Institutional Ownership 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
[14.95] [11.36] [3.37] [2.88] 
Analyst Following 0.289*** 0.463*** 0.058 0.244** 
[11.36] [9.47] [0.86] [2.56] 
Return Volatility -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.180*** -0.180*** 
[-11.47] [-8.06] [-11.93] [-8.17] 
Equity Issuance  -0.150*** -0.111* -0.249*** -0.245*** 
[-4.16] [-1.91] [-4.32] [-2.65] 
High Litigation Industry 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.123*** 0.104 
[8.50] [3.10] [3.12] [1.25] 
Number of obs. 19,340 19,340 5,507 5,507 
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TABLE 7 
 Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts  
 
This table presents the analyses of the relation between liquid CDS trading and the frequency of bad news earnings 
forecasts. The analyses are restricted to forecasting firms (i.e., firm-year observations with at least one management 
forecast). Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A present the analyses of the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts, 
while columns (3) and (4) present the analyses of the frequency of bad news earnings forecasts, conditional on credit 
news (measured by the magnitude of the abnormal annual CDS spread change). Specifications (1) and (3) present 
Poisson regressions of the frequency of bad news management forecasts, while specifications (2) and (4) present 
Tobit regressions of the relative frequency of bad news earnings forecasts (i.e., the ratio of bad news to the total 
number of management forecasts). Panel B presents analyses for the sample of liquid CDS firms with negative news 
in the forecast year and their matched control firms. For each sample firm with liquid CDSs that experiences 
negative news we match a firm without liquid CDSs based on the magnitude of negative news. In Columns (1) and 
(2) we match firms based on the magnitude of a negative earnings surprise. In columns (3) and (4), we match firms 
based on the magnitude of the increase in abnormal CDS spread. Robust z-statistics are in brackets and are clustered 
by firm. 
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Panel A: Liquid CDSs and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
Bad News 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Relative  
Bad News 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Bad News 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Relative  
Bad News 
Forecast 
Frequency 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Liquid CDS 0.177*** 0.051** 
[3.31] [2.35] 
 Liquid CDS Low Spread 
Change   0.119** 0.032 
[1.97] [1.37] 
Liquid CDS High Spread 
Change   0.276*** 0.084*** 
[4.67] [3.28] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.017 -0.029*** -0.016 -0.029*** 
[-1.32] [-4.93] [-1.29] [-4.92] 
Market to Book -0.010** -0.009*** -0.010** -0.009*** 
[-2.16] [-4.37] [-2.14] [-4.36] 
ROA 0.151 -0.343*** 0.154 -0.342*** 
[1.42] [-5.78] [1.45] [-5.78] 
Institutional Ownership 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
[7.69] [4.84] [7.71] [4.84] 
Analyst Following 0.024 -0.044*** 0.024 -0.044*** 
[0.78] [-3.14] [0.79] [-3.14] 
Return Volatility -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.003 
[-0.58] [0.69] [-0.63] [0.66] 
Equity Issuance  0.005 0.03 0.004 0.03 
[0.13] [1.39] [0.11] [1.38] 
High Litigation Industry -0.017 -0.060*** -0.016 -0.060*** 
[-0.47] [-4.12] [-0.46] [-4.12] 
F-test: Liquid CDS High 
Spread Change vs.    0.157 0.051 
Liquid CDS Low Spread 
Change [p-value]   [0.006] [0.034] 
Number of obs. 10,692 10,692 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.018 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Bad News Management Forecasts 
Panel B: Negative news sample  
Negative news 
measure =   Negative earnings surprise Increase in abnormal CDS spread 
 
Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
Relative  Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
Relative  
Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
Bad News Forecast 
Frequency 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Liquid CDS 0.407*** 0.083* 0.290*** 0.071** 
[4.54] [1.79] [3.69] [2.19] 
Log (Total Assets) -0.078*** -0.050*** -0.071* -0.037** 
[-2.94] [-3.30] [-1.83] [-2.11] 
Market to Book -0.008 -0.011** -0.023* -0.006 
[-0.86] [-2.28] [-1.71] [-1.24] 
ROA 0.581* -0.095 0.233 -0.561* 
[1.88] [-0.54] [0.40] [-1.74] 
Institutional 
Ownership 0.002* 0.001* 0.003* 0.001** 
[1.83] [1.80] [1.73] [2.10] 
Analyst 
Following -0.015 -0.055 0.031 -0.038 
[-0.23] [-1.45] [0.39] [-1.04] 
Return Volatility 0.003 -0.004 0.013 -0.002 
[0.12] [-0.34] [0.40] [-0.11] 
Equity Issuance  -0.157 -0.049 -0.153 0.068 
[-1.31] [-0.74] [-1.22] [1.08] 
High Litigation 
Industry 0.111* -0.009 -0.124 -0.091*** 
[1.67] [-0.26] [-1.33] [-2.64] 
Number of obs. 1,150 1,150 1,122 1,122 
Pseudo R2 0.0160 0.0251 0.0158 0.0305 
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TABLE 8 
Active CDS Trading and the Frequency of Unbundled Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
This table presents the analyses of the relation between liquid CDS trading and the frequency of unbundled bad 
news earnings forecasts (i.e., forecasts that are not issued in conjunction with earnings announcements). 
Specification (1) presents a Poisson regression of the frequency of bad news management forecasts, while 
specification (2) presents a Tobit regression of the relative frequency of bad news earnings forecasts (i.e., the ratio of 
bad news to the total number of management forecasts).  Robust z-statistics are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
 
Unbundled Bad News                 
Forecast Frequency  
Relative Unbundled Bad News                  
Forecast Frequency 
    (1) (2) 
Liquid CDS 0.177*** 0.055** 
[2.74] [2.36] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.032** -0.005 
[2.12] [-0.77] 
Market to Book 0.007 -0.000 
[1.22] [-0.01] 
ROA 0.401** -0.135** 
[2.46] [-2.14] 
Institutional Ownership 0.003*** 0.000** 
[4.43] [2.01] 
Analyst Following -0.043 -0.058*** 
[-1.08] [-3.91] 
Return Volatility -0.039*** -0.010* 
[-2.80] [-1.89] 
Equity Issuance  -0.210*** -0.063** 
[-3.43] [-2.57] 
High Litigation Industry 0.034 -0.012 
[0.77] [-0.79] 
Number of obs. 10,692 10,692 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.004 
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TABLE 9 
 Active CDS Trading and Voluntary Disclosure via Press Releases 
 
This table presents the analyses of the association between liquid CDS trading and voluntary disclosure via press 
releases. Column (1) presents the Poisson regression analysis of the number of press releases. Column (2) presents a 
Poisson regression of the frequency of negative press releases. Column (3) presents a Tobit regression of the relative 
frequency of negative press releases (the ratio of negative press releases to the total number of press releases). 
Robust z-statistics are in brackets and are clustered by firm. 
  
Number of  Bad News Press  Relative Bad News  
Press Releases Release Frequency Press Release Frequency 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Liquid CDS 0.264*** 0.307*** 0.010*** 
[7.79] [6.86] [2.62] 
Log (Total Assets) 0.179*** 0.296*** 0.018*** 
[22.11] [28.93] [20.05] 
Market to Book 0.019*** 0.007 -0.001 
[6.22] [1.34] [-1.60] 
ROA -0.282*** -0.509*** -0.045*** 
[-7.42] [-6.48] [-7.05] 
Institutional Ownership 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 
[1.89] [2.36] [0.81] 
Analyst Following 0.205*** 0.102*** -0.007*** 
[10.93] [3.33] [-2.70] 
Return Volatility 0.015*** 0.090*** 0.009*** 
[4.35] [14.60] [12.81] 
Equity Issuance  0.098*** 0.144*** 0.006* 
[5.82] [4.50] [1.91] 
High Litigation Industry 0.247*** 0.203*** 0.006** 
[10.41] [5.05] [2.07] 
Number of obs. 23,555 23,555 23,555 
Pseudo R2 0.344 0.182 0.178 
  
 
 
 
 
